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A Trump Tariff Wall Would Help a Little, But Hurt a Lot

Mother Jones

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So let’s suppose that Donald Trump really does impose a 10 or 15 percent tariff on all goods entering the United States. Or maybe only Chinese and Mexican goods.1 What would happen? Who would be the winners and losers?

The simplest way to think about this is to remember what happens when tariffs are reduced. Textbook economics says that overall GDP will grow, prices will go down, but certain groups of people will be disproportionately harmed. So if tariffs are increased, the opposite should happen. Economic growth would suffer, prices would go up for most people, but certain groups would benefit. It’s not always clear what those groups are, but generally speaking workers in the sectors most vulnerable to foreign competition would probably benefit: textiles, clothes, shoes, rubber products, computer assembly, and so forth.

That’s the theory, anyway. The reality is sometimes different. Free traders, for example, often point to the example of automobile tires. In 2009, President Obama slapped a huge tariff on Chinese tires in order to protect the US tire industry. The chart on the right shows what happened: other countries rushed to fill the void and tire imports skyrocketed. The usual estimate is that about 1,200 jobs were saved at a cost to US consumers of $1.1 billion. That’s $900,000 per job, which is obviously a bad deal, but it’s also a diffuse deal. Unions and tire workers were happy regardless of how things turned out, while consumers probably barely noticed that they were paying an extra dollar per tire.

If Trump enacted a tariff only on China, this is roughly what would happen: some of China’s business would move to other countries, and net US imports would stay about the same. China would lose, other countries would gain, and in America it would be a wash.

But what if Trump enacted a 10-15 percent tariff across the board on every country? Economically, that would act like a sales tax on foreign goods. Prices would go up, which would allow American companies to increase production in sectors where a 10-15 percent advantage was enough to make them competitive.2 The exact way this would shake out depends on the elasticity of demand for various goods, but in the end American workers in certain sectors would almost certainly make gains, while all American consumers would pay higher prices. Is this tradeoff worth it? I’d say no, but plenty of people would disagree.

That’s the 100-thousand-foot view, anyway. In real life, other countries would almost certainly retaliate—maybe via tariffs of their own, maybe in other ways. Boeing, for example, usually suffers when the Chinese get annoyed with us, because Chinese airlines develop a sudden fondness for Airbus planes. Or the authorities in Beijing could make life harder for American companies doing business in China. Or they could get nasty in any of a dozen other ways. Ditto for the rest of the world, which would appeal to the WTO at best and retaliate with their own trade barriers at worst.

And no matter what the rest of the world did, American companies would face headaches for years as they tried to rework their supply chains, which are global for nearly every product you can think of. American products use lots of parts made overseas, and lots of overseas products use parts (and services) from America. For example, a San Francisco Fed paper estimates that 55 percent of the value of Chinese goods is actually US content. To make this concrete, think about iPhones: If China ends up making fewer iPhones, that also means fewer jobs for the Apple sales force and lower sales for the plant in Texas that makes iPhone processors. The whole thing is a mess—and it’s especially a mess if companies have no assurance about how long the tariffs will stay around or what’s around the corner from the rest of the world as they figure out ways to get back at us.

The bottom line is this:

The impact on workers in certain sectors would be anything from negative (in the case of a big trade war) to fairly positive (if the tariffs worked and the rest of the world decided to ride it out).
Prices would go up for everyone. And since low-income workers buy more goods as a share of their income, higher prices would hit them the hardest.
Economic growth would almost certainly slow down.

Most likely, Trump’s tariffs would be a bad deal for nearly everyone, and maybe—maybe—a good deal for a few workers and CEOs in the sectors that have been hardest hit by foreign competition.

More generally, you can’t really talk about “trade” in the abstract. Basically, there’s China and there’s everyone else. China is our big problem, but the trouble with retaliating against China is that it’s too late. We have lost a lot of jobs to them, but the damage was mostly done years ago. By the time Obama took office there was little he could do, and there’s even less that Trump can do now. It’s also true that China was a bad actor on the world economic stage for a long time. But again, their worst practices are mostly in the past. Their export subsidies are fairly low these days, and their currency manipulation is mostly to push the yuan up, not down. This benefits America, not China.

There is one best-case scenario, though: Trump threatens the Chinese and ends up getting some concessions from them without ever enacting any tariffs. Is that likely? I guess that depends on how good a negotiator you think Trump is. Unfortunately, his record in the business world doesn’t give much cause for optimism on that front.

1Yes, he could do it. Details here.

2For example, if China makes clocks for $2 and America makes clocks for $3, a 15 percent tariff wouldn’t do anything for American clockmakers. Even at a Chinese price of $2.30, Americans still couldn’t compete. However, consumers would end up paying $2.30 for clocks instead of $2.

On the other hand, if China makes cars for $9,000 and America makes cars for $10,000, a tariff could have a big effect. Chinese cars would now cost $10,350, and that means consumers would buy a lot more American cars. Unless, of course, they really prefer the Chinese cars even at a higher price. It all depends, you see.

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A Trump Tariff Wall Would Help a Little, But Hurt a Lot

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Trump now sounds like every other right-wing Republican on energy — well, almost

Trump now sounds like every other right-wing Republican on energy — well, almost

By on May 27, 2016 12:01 amShare

Donald Trump has sold himself as a different kind of Republican, but in his first energy policy speech on Thursday, he adopted the same tired, old energy ideas that have been trotted out by the GOP establishment for years. The only difference: Trump doesn’t actually understand the issues at play, so he avoided specifics and made absurd, impossible-to-keep promises.

Trump was not the fossil fuel industry’s preferred candidate. Primary opponents who had  proven their deference to big business, such as Jeb Bush and Ted Cruz, were considered a safer bet by the oil, gas, and coal barons. Trump, with no real ideology and a tendency to flip-flop, was seen as more of a wildcard. Still, I predicted in March that if Trump locked up the nomination, he would adopt the traditional Republican energy agenda, just as once-moderate Mitt Romney had in 2012. And that’s exactly what Trump has now done.

We got a hint that Trump was headed in this direction when he brought on oil-loving Rep. Kevin Cramer (R-N.D.) as his energy policy advisor earlier this month. Cramer has an extremely anti-environment record, including a lifetime voting score of 1 percent from the League of Conservation Voters.

Then, last week, Trump met with and sucked up to Bob Murray, CEO of Murray Energy, a coal mining company. Murray is such a staunch Republican that he is alleged to have pressured employees to donate to Romney’s 2012 campaign. Massey emerged from that meeting to say he was backing Trump, but that even he thinks Trump’s grandiose promises to bring back coal are impossible. (Trump also revealed that he doesn’t know what liquefied natural gas is.)

Saying all the right-wing stuff, sorta

In his speech at an oil industry conference in heavily-fracked North Dakota on Thursday, Trump called for much less regulation and much more drilling, fracking, and mining. But, in typical Trump fashion, he took things a step further than most Republicans do. In 2012, Romney called, nonsensically, for “North American energy independence.” Trump, though, doesn’t want Canada intruding on his effort to make America great again, so he said, “Under my presidency, we will accomplish complete American energy independence.” Never mind that “energy independence,” North American or otherwise, is impossible as long as we depend on fossil fuels that can be sold on the global market. Trump said he would ensure that we are “no longer at the mercy of global markets,” but more domestic drilling won’t free us from the tyranny of international markets unless we nationalize all of the oil companies and force them to sell only to Americans. Otherwise, rising demand in Asia or supply disruptions in the Middle East will continue to affect the price of gasoline.

Trump put his own spin on the Keystone XL issue too. He got the party line right when he said that he would “absolutely” approve the pipeline, but then he added that he would negotiate “a better deal.” The U.S. should get a “piece of the profits” from Keystone, he said. “That’s how we’re gonna make our country rich again.” That sort of kickback scheme may have worked when Trump was allegedly cutting deals with mafia-run construction outfits as a New York City developer, but there is no current mechanism for it under U.S. law.

He also promised “energy reform that creates trillions of dollars in wealth.” However he came up with that ridiculous number, he might as well have pulled it out of thin air. The only source he cited for the huge economic benefits of environmental deregulation was the Institute for Energy Research, a conservative advocacy organization founded by Charles Koch and run by a former Enron executive.

Trump’s pledge that in his first 100 days in office he would, “rescind all the job-destroying Obama executive actions including the Climate Action Plan” also offered political talking points rather than thoughtful policymaking. The Climate Action Plan is not an executive action, but a collection of actions, some of which are EPA rules, like the Clean Power Plan. It’s not clear which agency would repeal those rules if he first abolished the EPA, as he proposes. And removing those rules would be vulnerable in court without Congress first getting rid of the Clean Air Act and other legislation that requires the government to regulate pollutants.

Trump’s new energy agenda is all Republican politics without even the patina of policy seriousness offered by some more experienced politicians.

Playing to two wings of the party

Trump’s energy speech was all about holding the Republican coalition together: reaching out to the fossil fuel lobby while continuing to appeal to his rural, white, Christian base. In the primaries, Trump was the candidate of the party’s unwashed masses. Now he has to win over the elite business wing, especially now that he is raising money from them for his general election campaign. In a press conference before his speech, he gave repeated shoutouts to Harold Hamm, a North Dakota businessman who has made billions in oil and gas drilling and donated heavily to Republican campaigns.

Then he made his overture to the white working class by praising coal miners and their way of life. “The miners, they’re incredible people. I asked a couple of them, ‘Why don’t you go into some other profession?’ And they said, ‘We love going after coal.’” Trump’s pro-coal stance is so transparently political rather than based on any serious policy engagement that he just says coal is great because miners are great. And miners are great because they “love going after coal.” It’s circular logic. And like Trump’s slogan, “Make America Great Again,” it defines America’s past as its peak.

Likewise, Trump’s vow to undermine international climate negotiations — “We’re going to cancel the Paris Climate Agreement and stop all payments of U.S. tax dollars to U.N. global warming programs” — is as much a statement of nationalist, anti-U.N. resentment as anything to do with energy or environmental policy. It doesn’t matter that he wouldn’t be able to unilaterally pull the U.S. out of the deal.

Trump’s energy speech on Thursday demonstrated two things: he’s trying to reassure the GOP establishment that he will be a team player their economic agenda but he still has no idea what he’s talking about when it comes to energy policy. But if he becomes president, he’ll find out the hard way that we can’t drill our way to “energy independence.”

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Trump now sounds like every other right-wing Republican on energy — well, almost

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